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Abstract 
 
  
The design of integrated mobility-on-demand services requires jointly considering the interactions 
between traveler choice behavior and operators’ operation policies to design a financially sustainable 
pricing scheme. However, most existing studies focus on the supply side perspective, disregarding the 
impact of customer choice behavior in the presence of co-existing transport networks. We propose a 
modeling framework for dynamic integrated mobility-on-demand service operation policy evaluation 
with two service options: door-to-door rideshare and rideshare with transit transfer. A new constrained 
dynamic pricing model is proposed to maximize operator profit, taking into account the correlated 
structure of different modes of transport. User willingness to pay is considered as a stochastic constraint, 
resulting in a more realistic ticket price setting while maximizing operator profit. Unlike most studies, 
which assume that travel demand is known, we propose a demand learning process to calibrate customer 
demand over time based on customers’ historical purchase data. We evaluate the proposed methodology 
through simulations under different scenarios on a test network by considering the interactions of supply 
and demand in a multimodal market. Different scenarios in terms of customer arrival intensity, vehicle 
capacity, and the variance of user willingness to pay are tested. Results suggest that the proposed chance-
constrained assortment price optimization model allows increasing operator profit while keeping the 
proposed ticket prices acceptable.  
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1. Introduction 
Mobility on demand (MOD) services such as taxis, paratransit, ride-hailing, and microtransit, etc. have 
received increasing interest as they are user-centered, convenient, and present huge potential to alleviate 
the inconvenience of conventional fixed-route transit (Kwoka-Coleman, 2017). With the emerging 
autonomous vehicle (AV) technology and the tendency for Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS), future urban 
mobility will be shaped towards a more automated, clean, and seamless multimodal transportation 
service. In line with this research challenge, in recent years there have been several initiatives based on 
public–private partnerships to provide transit-integrated mobility services that extend a classical 
monomodal MOD service to an integrated multimodal service (Etherington, 2017). The integrated MOD 
services have great potential for reducing operating costs and customers’ waiting times and increase the 
service capacity and ridership of transit systems (Ma et al., 2019a). Like many existing microtransit 
services, a transport network company (TNC) operates a fleet of capacitated vehicles with flexible routes 
to provide customers with either direct rides or combined rides (e.g., rideshare+transit) by integrating 
rideshare as a part of the multimodal trip for customers. An example is illustrated in Fig. 1. Customers 
book their trips in advance via smartphone or internet. The operator proposes a service assortment with 
relevant attributes, i.e., fare, waiting time, in-vehicle riding time, etc. Customers make their choice based 
on their implicit travel preferences in a multimodal market. The integrated MOD services are 
particularly suitable for rural areas due to low accessibility to public transport and scattered travel 
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demand. Due to the uncertainty of customer demand and the competition from other transport means, 
most (integrated) MOD services adopt a low fixed-fare strategy supported by subsidies from the 
government (Go Centennial Final Report, 2017). Several failed microtransit services such as Helsinki’s 
Kutsuplus (Sulopuisto, 2016) and San Francisco’s Chariot (Hawkins, 2019) show the importance of 
travel demand estimation and pricing strategy for the successful deployment of MOD services. 
However, most studies mainly focus on vehicle dispatching and routing policy design (Agatz et al., 
2012) or pricing (Atasoy et al., 2015; Sayarshad and Chow, 2015) without jointly modeling customer 
mode choice behavior in a competing multimodal market. Moreover, when considering customer choice 
behavior, most studies require conducting a relevant mobility survey to calibrate the model parameters 
(Wen et al., 2018).  
Recent efforts have been devoted to the development of agent-based simulation tools for the evaluation 
of MOD services. For example, Levin et al. (2017) proposed an agent-based simulation framework by 
considering a realistic traffic flow model for dynamic ridesharing impact evaluation using shared 
autonomous vehicles (SAV).  Customer mode choice behavior is not considered in this study. Chen et 
al. (2019) propose an agent-based model for dynamic ridesharing simulation evaluation in a multimodal 
market. Heuristic rules are proposed to model agent mode choice decisions by considering maximum 
waiting time and travel time for three mode alternatives, i.e., drive-alone, ridesharing, and public transit. 
Hörl et al. (2019) proposed an agent-based simulation framework using MATSim to evaluate the impact 
of deploying an automated taxi fleet on Paris. A discrete choice model is applied to simulate user mode 
choice decisions in a multimodal market. Their analysis shows the impact of SAV is significantly 
influenced by the interplay of operational cost, demand, and ticket prices. Vosooghi et al. (2019) 
conducted a comprehensive simulation evaluation on the impact of SAV using MATSim by considering 
all operational and demand-side travel preference variations. The authors emphasize the importance of 
considering dynamic demand in a multimodal market for the impact evaluation of SAV services. Ma et 
al. (2018, 2019a) developed a dynamic bimodal ridesharing model, allowing the operator to provide a 
suite of options to minimize operation costs. Their simulation case study of New York City shows that 
integrating rideshare services with public transport could reduce operation costs and increase public 
transport ridership. However, demand is assumed to be fixed, and customer preference and pricing issues 
were not considered. It is desirable to jointly consider the interactions of traveler choice behavior and 
operator operation and pricing policy to evaluate ridership and achieve the desired objective (e.g., social 
welfare/profit maximization). Some recent research has started looking at user–operator assignments 
based on the assignment game approach in a static setting (Rasulkhani and Chow, 2019; Ma et al., 
2019b). In contrast to past studies, we focus on dynamic pricing with demand learning for an integrated 
microtransit service considering the interaction of supply and demand in a multimodal market.   
 
Fig. 1. Integrated microtransit system. Based on request origins and destinations, an operator proposes 
two options: “rideshare only I” and “rideshare+transit (RT)”, with differentiated ticket prices and levels 
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of service (out-of-vehicle time, in-vehicle time). The latter includes rideshare–transit–rideshare  (RTR) 
and walk–transit–rideshare (WTR/RTW) or vice versa. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing integrated MOD operation models takes into account 
the supply–demand interactions for dynamic price optimization. Unlike existing surge pricing 
methodology, which is based on friction of supply and demand, our approach integrates customer’s 
preference into dynamic pricing settings under uncertainty to maximize the operator’s profit. This is the 
first study to demonstrate an integrated microtransit operation policy design with demand learning and 
constrained dynamic pricing in a competing transportation market.  
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. 
 We propose a modeling framework for a dynamic integrated microtransit system with customer 
demand learning and dynamic pricing. The proposed model learns customer mode choice 
preferences in a multimodal market based on the operator’s historical ride data. We demonstrate 
that the choice model can be calibrated and updated regularly.  
 We propose a dynamic pricing model based on chance-constrained assortment optimization. Unlike 
existing methodologies (Atasoy et al., 2015; Qiu 2017), we consider customers’ willingness-to-pay 
to constrain proposed ticket prices. A nested logit model (NL) is proposed to capture the correlation 
of different choice alternatives in the assortment price optimization.  
 We conduct a series of simulation studies on a test network to evaluate the impact of the proposed 
methodology on an operator’s revenue, operating cost, and customer inconvenience. Several 
scenarios related to different customer arrival intensities, vehicle capacity, and the variance of 
customers’ willingness to pay are tested. The results show that the proposed chance-constrained 
pricing model would result in reasonable ticket prices and significantly increase operator profit, with 
higher “rideshare+transit” ridership shifted from “rideshare only”. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review existing studies on integrated MOD service 
planning, dynamic pricing methodology, and customer demand learning. In Section 3, we propose a 
modeling framework for an integrated microtransit service with dynamic pricing. Section 4 presents a 
chance-constrained dynamic assortment pricing optimization model for the integrated MOD services. 
In Section 5, numerical studies are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed model under 
different demand intensities. We also present a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the impact of key decision 
parameters. Finally, conclusions are drawn and future extensions are discussed. 
2. Literature review    
Existing integrated rideshare service studies mainly focus on vehicle dispatching and routing policy to 
minimize operating costs and customer inconvenience (Häll, 2006; Ma et al., 2019a, among many 
others). Travel demand is assumed to be fixed, without considering the co-existence of other transport 
means. The traditional traffic assignment methodology is not suitable for modeling user–operator traffic 
flow for MOD services (Chiu et al., 2011; Lebacque et al., 2007) as demand for a rideshare service 
depends on its system characteristics alone, without considering the competition from other transport 
means and customer preference. Some recent studies have started looking at these issues (Liu et al., 
2018; Wen et al., 2018; Hörl et al., 2019; Vosooghi et al., 2019). These studies show travel demand is 
sensitive to service pricing as well as its level of service. However, how to integrate customer travel 
choice preference into the MOD service pricing remains an issue for a successful deployment of 
emerging MOD services.  
Dynamic pricing is a price-based revenue management strategy in which sellers adjust the selling prices 
of goods over time based on customer demand to maximize the expected profit of sales. It is a widely 
adopted revenue management strategy in business or industrial sectors such as retailers, electricity, air 
transportation, and ride-sourcing markets (den Boer, 2015; Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2006). In recent 
years, dynamic pricing has been receiving much research interest in the ridesharing and ride-hailing 
market. Based on whether there exists an intermediary platform to match riders and drivers, we can 
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distinguish the market as a one-sided or two-sided market. For the one-sided market, Sayarshad and 
Chow (2015) propose a non-myopic vehicle dispatching and pricing model for the dial-a-ride problem 
based on an M/M/1 queuing system. Pricing is determined to achieve a social optimum. Sayarshad and 
Gao (2018) further extend this study based on a multi-server queuing system and propose socially 
efficient and profit-maximization pricing schemes. Their case study using New York City taxicab data 
shows that the proposed model could significantly increase social welfare compared to the model based 
on the single queuing system. In line with the queuing-theory-based approach, Chen and Wang (2018) 
propose a pricing model to maximize the social welfare of a last-mile transportation service based on a 
multi-service queue system. Chen and Kockelman (2016) propose an agent-based modeling framework 
to evaluate the potential impact of different pricing schemes for deploying shared autonomous electric 
vehicles. Three pricing schemes, i.e., distance-based, origin-/destination-based, and mixed pricing 
schemes, are tested under the multinomial logit model (MNL) model to model traveler mode choice 
behavior by considering private-use AVs, shared-use AVs, and transit. For the two-sided market, 
Banerjee et al. (2015) developed a queuing-system-based dynamic pricing model and evaluate the 
impact on the revenue and the number of matches of the platform. Yan et al. (2019) survey the current 
matching and dynamic pricing mechanisms of ride-hailing. They find that surge pricing, i.e., 
dynamically adjusted ticket prices during high-demand periods, would reduce customer waiting times 
and increase service reliability and capacity.  
While these studies propose different dynamic pricing schemes to adjust supply–demand mismatch, the 
traveler decision process in a multimodal market is not considered. Several recent studies integrate 
demand modeling in dynamic pricing based on the assortment optimization approach. Atasoy et al. 
(2015) propose an MNL-based assortment optimization model to maximize an operator's expected profit 
for three types of services: taxi, shared-taxi, and mini-bus services, given relevant constraints on vehicle 
operations (i.e., scheduling and/or capacity). Qiu (2017) integrates customer choice behavior based on 
the MNL model for the assortment price optimization of MOD services. A reference mode is assumed 
when customers do not choose to use the proposed MOD services. From a customer’s point of view, it 
is relevant to consider mode choice behavior in a multimodal market. Moreover, most assortment-
optimization-based approaches fail to consider customer willingness to pay, resulting in an unreasonably 
high ticket price setting.  
Traditionally, it is desirable to conduct expensive revealed/stated preference surveys to collect travel 
preference data for demand function estimation. However, it is possible to learn the characteristics of 
customer demand via historical sales data, without additional surveys. For example, Talluri and Van 
Ryzin (2006) propose an estimation procedure based on the expectation-maximization method for 
MNL-based choice model estimation using historical purchase data. Sauré and Zeevi (2013) propose an 
assortment-optimization model with demand learning from customer historical data to estimate an 
MNL-based choice model. Bertsimas and Perakis (2006) assume that unknown demand is a function of 
price, which follows some probability distribution family. The authors propose a pricing mechanism 
based on dynamic programming to jointly learn demand parameters and set up optimal prices. The reader 
is referred to den Boer (2015) for a comprehensive literature review of dynamic pricing with demand 
learning. Table 1 summarizes the recent literature on dynamic pricing for MOD operation policy design.    
Table 1. Summary of recent literature on dynamic pricing for on-demand mobility services 
Reference Service type Characteristics   Mode choice 
modeling and 
demand learning  
Qiu (2017); Atasoy 
et al. (2015) 
Mobility on-
demand services 
Logit-model-based assortment 
optimization 
No 
Sayarshad and 
Chow (2015);  
Sayarshad and Gao 
(2018) 
Dynamic dial-a-
ride and pricing 
problems  
Non-myopic pricing based on service 
queue approximations  
No 
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Zha et al. (2018) Ride-sourcing  Surge pricing No 
Banerjee et al. 
(2015) 
Ridesharing in a 
two-sided market 
Surge pricing based on supply–demand 
imbalance using a queuing model 
No 
Wang et al. (2016); 
Zhang and Ukkusuri 
(2016) 
Taxi  Market equilibrium model for a two-
sided market 
No 
Chen and Wang 
(2018)  
Last-mile 
transportation 
service   
Constrained optimization under service-
level constraints  
No 
Chen and 
Kockelman (2016) 
Shared autonomous 
electric vehicle 
fleet management 
and pricing 
Distance-/origin-/destination-based 
dynamic pricing schemes  
Yes 
Karamanis et al. 
(2018) 
 
Ride-sourcing 
using autonomous 
vehicles 
One-sided market, utility-based dynamic 
pricing considering travel time, waiting 
time, and prices for mode choice 
decision making.  
Nested logit model 
for modeling choice 
between private, 
shared rides, and 
transit  
 
3. Modeling dynamic microtransit with transit transfer 
We consider a dynamic microtransit (ridesharing) service planning problem with dynamic pricing in a 
multimodal transportation market. A microtransit service provider operates unimodal (rideshare only) 
and bimodal (rideshare+transit) ridesharing services based on a fleet of homogeneous capacitated 
vehicles 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣|𝑉|}. The bimodal ridesharing service is a service integrated with the existing 
transit network to provide a seamless multimodal solution for passenger transportation. We model the 
problem on a direct graph 𝐺(𝑁, 𝐸), where 𝑁 is a set of nodes and 𝐸 is a set of links. The set of nodes 
includes customer pick-up and drop-off locations, vehicle depots, and transit stations. Travel time 𝑡𝑖𝑗 
from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗 is the average travel time in a studied area. We assume that demand is unknown, 
and customer arrivals are stochastic following a Poisson process with an arrival intensity of 𝜆. Empirical 
customer arrival patterns can be applied for realistic applications. Customer mode choice preferences 
are assumed unknown and considered in light of the presence of other transport means. We consider a 
day-to-day mode choice setting under stochastic demand. Traveler choice decisions are based on random 
utility theory in a multimodal market (Train, 2009). As different mode choice alternatives might be 
correlated, the nested logit model is applied to capture its correlation.  
The characteristics of the system are as follows.  
 A fleet of capacitated vehicles are operated by a dispatching center that determines vehicle routing, 
pricing, and dispatching. All vehicles are initiated at initial depots at the beginning of each day and 
return to the depots at the end of that day. When a new customer needs a ride, he/she sends a ride 
request to the operator from his/her smartphone. The request includes relevant information 
comprising the desired pickup and drop-off locations and pick-up time.  
 Upon receiving a request, the operator first identifies available vehicles within a given service range 
(e.g., 5 km service radius of customer pickup locations) as potential candidates for vehicle dispatch. 
The service-range-based dispatching policy has been widely adopted in realistic applications for 
ride-hailing services. Based on the designed routing policy (Eq. (1) and (2)) and vehicle capacity 
constraints, the operator proposes two options: rideshare only (R) or rideshare+transit (RT). A quote 
is then sent to the customer with relevant information including fare, walking time, waiting time, 
in-vehicle travel time, and transfer time whenever relevant. If the new customer accepts the offer, 
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the dispatching center assigns a vehicle to serve the customer and updates the system states. 
Otherwise, the customer rejects the offer and chooses an alternative among available transport 
means. With the aim of improving the MOD service, the new customer is asked to report their mode 
choice in all cases (to use or not use the MOD services). We also assume that once the customer’s 
decision is made, he/she will carry out his/her decision.   
 For the idle vehicle repositioning strategy, we apply the myopic idle vehicle relocation policy, 
known for its computational efficiency (Ma et al., 2019a; Sayarshad and Chow, 2017). The idle 
vehicle relocation policy is activated at the beginning of each rebalancing epoch (e.g., 10–15 
minutes). An en-route switching policy is applied to allow in-transition idle vehicles to pick up new 
customers.  
We apply a non-myopic vehicle dispatching and routing policy to anticipate future system state 
(Sayarshad and Chow, 2015). The non-myopic policy assigns a new request to vehicles with the 
minimum additional insertion cost considering future delay costs, as follows. 
{𝑣∗, 𝑥𝑡
𝑣∗} = argmin𝑣 ,𝑥[𝑐 (𝑣, 𝑥𝑡
𝑣) − 𝑐(𝑣, 𝑥 )]                                           (1) 
where  𝑥𝑡
𝑣 is a new tour after a new request is inserted. 𝑐(𝑣, 𝑥) is a cost function for vehicle 𝑣 operating 
tour 𝑥, defined in Eq. (2) as 
𝑐(𝑣, 𝑥) =  𝛾𝑇(𝑣, 𝑥) + (1 − 𝛾)[𝛽 𝑇(𝑣, 𝑥)2 + ∑ 𝑌𝑛(𝑣 , 𝑥)𝑛∈𝑃𝑣 ]                                                  (2) 
where 𝑇(𝑣, 𝑥) is the length (measured in time) of tour 𝑥. 𝑌𝑛(𝑣 , 𝑥) is the journey time, including waiting 
time and in-vehicle travel time for passenger 𝑛. 𝑃𝑣 is the set of passengers on board of vehicle 𝑣. Eq. (2) 
considers the weighted sum of the system cost and on-board customer inconvenience based on a user-
defined parameter 𝛾. Note that the above vehicle dispatching policy is a post-optimization method, 
which minimizes additional system costs by anticipating future system delays when inserting a new 
request. The practitioner can further consider time windows constraints associated with customer’s 
pickup and drop-off locations and apply dedicated algorithms for vehicle routing and dispatching 
(Häme, 2011). 
When the operator receives a request, two options (i.e., rideshare only and rideshare+transit) are 
considered for each nearby vehicle within a pre-defined search radius. The generation of the two options 
is described as follows. 
 
-Rideshare only:  Given a set of nearby vehicles within the service range of a new request, a least-cost 
vehicle dispatch with respect to Eq. (1) is calculated. We use insertion-based heuristics (Mosheiov, 
1994) to solve the underlying travelling salesman problem with pick-up and delivery (TSPPD). The 
reader is referred to Sayarshad and Chow (2015) for more details.  
 
- Rideshare+Transit (RT): This option divides a trip into a sequence of trip legs. It considers a 
“rideshare” leg from a user’s origin to a “least-time” (in terms of door-to-door trip, described in 
Algorithm 1) transit station and a “transit” leg to the final destination. The egress part from an exit 
station to the customer’s destination is assumed to occur on foot. Note that other combinations (i.e., 
rideshare–transit–rideshare and walk–transit–rideshare) can be searched for realistic applications (Ma 
et al., 2019a).  
The modeling framework of the integrated MOD system with dynamic pricing and demand learning is 
depicted in Fig. 2. The details of vehicle dispatching are described in Algorithm 1.       
 
Algorithm 1. Dynamic integrated microtransit with price optimization 
1. Initialization. Set day=1. Run the simulation without dynamic price optimization until all 
customers served. Initial parameters in the demand function.   
2. Day:= Day +1. Randomly generate customer arrivals. Upon arrival of a new customer r, update 
vehicles’ current state from the time of previous request r-1  
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3. For each vehicle within the service range of customer r, 
i. Compute the following two options given vehicle’s capacity constraints:   
 Rideshare only (R): Solve the TSPPD problem based on the re-optimization-based insertion 
algorithm (Mosheiov, 1994) to obtain a potential tour that minimizes the generalized cost 
function of Eq. (1). 
 Rideshare+Transit (RT): Two steps are applied. First, identify entry and exit stations based 
on minimizing total door-to-door travel time over k nearest entry and k nearest exit stations 
related to the origin and destination of r. We calculate travel time from origin to the entry 
station using rideshare by solving the TSPPD problem. Travel time in the transit system 
includes waiting time, transfer time, and in-vehicle travel time.      
ii. Determine optimal fare adjustments for R and RT options based on the chance-constrained 
assortment pricing optimization (described in Section 4).   
4. Send the quote to customer r. Customer makes a mode choice decision accordingly. Customer 
reports his/her choice decision via the operator’s app. If the RT option is chosen, update 
customer’s drop-off location to the corresponding station of the proposed RT option.   
5. Update the tour of the assigned vehicle. 
6. Continue until all customers are served.  
7. Update the mode choice model estimation based on the collected historical data. Go to Step 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Modeling framework of integrated microtransit with dynamic pricing and demand learning.  
 
Fig. 2 shows the proposed modeling approach, which jointly considers the interaction of supply and 
demand in a multimodal market. The decision to use the MOD service (or not) depends on the value of 
utility of different choice alternatives. Note that for simplification, we assume that the considered 
population (who is interested in using the system) is a small part of the total population; an individual’s 
mode choice decision has a marginal impact on the congestion of the existing transport infrastructure. 
One can relax this assumption by implementing more realistic transportation system characteristics to 
capture the congestion effect due to the collective behavior of each individual’s travel decision.       
4. Dynamic pricing with customer mode choice preference learning    
Unlike most MNL-based assortment price optimizations, we model customer mode choice behavior 
based on the NL model to capture the correlation between different mode choice alternatives (Train, 
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2009). Let C denote the universal mode choice set in a multimodal transportation market. We assume 
that the dependency among different choice alternatives is structured into two levels as shown in Fig. 3. 
Let 𝐶1 be the set of nests, defined as 𝐶1 = {nonmotorized, auto, public transport (PT)}. We assume 
that the IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) property holds among the nests. Let 𝑈𝑛𝑗 be the 
utility obtained by a customer n when choosing alternative 𝑗 (Train, 2009):    
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑚, 𝑚 ∈ 𝐶1 (3) 
where 𝑉𝑛𝑗 is the determinant part of the utility, which depends on alternative-specific and individual-
specific attributes. 𝜀𝑗  is a random variable following a Gumbel distribution capturing unobserved 
influence factors. Under the linear utility assumption, we specify 𝑉𝑛𝑗 as    
𝑉𝑛𝑗 = 𝛽𝐴𝑆𝐶 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑛𝑘
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑛𝑗
𝑗
 (4) 
where 𝛽𝐴𝑆𝐶  is an alternative-specific constant and 𝛽𝑘  and 𝛽𝑗  are individual- and alternative-specific 
parameters, respectively. 𝑋𝑛𝑘 and  𝑋𝑛𝑗 are a set of individual-specific and alternative-specific attributes, 
respectively. For simplicity, we consider only alternative-specific attributes, including out-vehicle travel 
time (OVTT, including walking time, waiting time, and transfer time), in-vehicle travel time (IVTT), 
and fare (monetary cost), i.e., 𝑋𝑛𝑗 = {𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑗, 𝐼𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑗, 𝑓𝑗}, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐶. Based on the NL model, the probability 
of customer n choosing alternative 𝑗 can be written as  
𝑃𝑛𝑗 = 𝑃(𝑗|𝑚)𝑃(𝑚), ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑚, ∀ 𝑚 ∈ 𝐶1 (5) 
where 𝑃𝑛(𝑗|𝑚) =  
𝑒
𝑉𝑛𝑗/𝜇𝑚
∑ 𝑒
𝑉𝑛𝑗/𝜇𝑚
𝑗∈𝐽𝑚
 and 𝑃𝑛(𝑚) =
𝑒𝜇𝑚𝐼𝑚
∑ 𝑒𝜇𝑠𝐼𝑠𝑠∈𝐶1
. 
The term 𝑃(𝑚) is the choice probability of nest m, and 𝑃(𝑗|𝑚) is the conditional probability of choosing 
j within nest m. 𝐼𝑚 is the inclusive value related to nest m, which measures the aggregate attractiveness 
of that nest, defined as  
𝐼𝑚 = ln ( ∑ 𝑒
1
𝜇𝑚
𝑉𝑛𝑗
𝑗∈𝐵𝑚
) (6) 
where 𝜇𝑚 > 0, ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝐶1, is the NL model parameters. 𝐵𝑚 is the subset of choice alternatives within nest 
m. 1-𝜇𝑚 represents the degree of correlations of unobserved utility among alternatives in a nest.   
Given a set of individuals, 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁, the log-likelihood function can be written as 
𝐿𝐿(𝛽) = ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑛𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑛𝑗
𝑗∈𝐶𝑛
 (7) 
where 𝑦𝑛𝑗  is an indicator taking a value of 1 if customer i chooses alternative j. 𝑃𝑛𝑗  is the choice 
probability defined by Eq. (4). As 𝑃𝑛𝑗 takes a closed form, the maximum-likelihood approach can be 
applied for the parameter estimation without difficulty.  
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Fig. 3. Nested structure of choice options for a traveler’s mode choice decision 
 
We consider a myopic assortment pricing optimization problem to maximize the operator’s expected 
profit for the current request (Atasoy et al., 2017). Optimizing the ticket price for a given time horizon 
requires applying an approximate dynamic programming approach to estimate the future system state; 
this is a well-known and difficult issue for the DARP problem (Sayarshad and Chow, 2015; Qiu, 2017). 
We limit ourselves to optimizing ticket prices for each single request to maximize the expected profit of 
the operator. According to the information provided with each new customer, i.e., desired origin, 
destination, desired pickup time, and choice decision, the operator constitutes the alternative-specific 
attributes for each alternative over time. We can then estimate the NL-based choice model for assortment 
price optimization to maximize the expected profit of the operator.  
The profit of MOD option 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑂 with price adjustment 𝛿𝑗 is defined as  
𝑓𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑂 (8) 
where 𝑓𝑗 is the fare for option j before price optimization. 𝑐𝑗 is the operation cost of option j. 𝛿𝑗 is the 
decision variable of the fare adjustment for option j. 𝐽𝑂 is the set of options provided by the operator, 
i.e., 𝐽𝑂 = {Rideshare, Rideshare + Transit}. The dynamic pricing problem consists in determining 
optimal ticket prices for the assortment 𝐽𝑂 to maximize the expected profit of the current ride request. 
Under the existing unconstrained assortment price optimization approach (Atasoy et al., 2015; Qiu, 
2017), the optimal prices might be too high, which is not desirable. To overcome this issue, we consider 
customers’ willingness to pay as constraints and propose a chance-constrained assortment price 
optimization model. In doing so, the optimal ticket prices will be bounded at the customer’s willingness 
to pay for that trip. Following Breidert (2005), we consider a customer’s willingness to pay 𝝕 as 
his/her maximum price to use the MOD service (i.e. rideshare and rideshare + transit). We assume 𝜛 
is a random variable, defined as Eq. (9).   
𝜛 = 𝑤 + 𝜀 (9) 
where 𝑤 is the perceived cost of the reference product (i.e., travel cost of using car for that trip, assuming 
as a linear function of travel time of trip) and 𝜀 is the differentiation value following a hypothetical 
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 𝜎 = 𝑠2. Given that customer willingness to pay is a 
random variable, the assortment price optimization becomes a chance-constrained optimization problem 
as in Eq. (10)–(11). 
10 
 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑗(𝛿𝑗)(𝑓𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗)
𝑗∈𝐽𝑂
 (10) 
s.t. 
𝑓𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗 ≤ 𝜛𝑛, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑂 (11) 
The objective function (10) is to find optimal fare adjustments to maximize the expected profit of the 
current ride request. 𝑃𝑛𝑗(𝛿𝑗) is the choice probability for customer n choosing MOD option 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑂 after 
the price adjustment 𝛿𝑗 . The price adjustment 𝛿𝑗 changes customer’s utility perception 𝑉𝑛𝑗(𝛿𝑗) given the 
fare adjustment 𝛿𝑗, defined as    
𝑉𝑛𝑗(𝛿𝑗) = 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽𝑓𝛿𝑗 (12) 
where 𝛽𝑓 is the coefficient of fare in the NL model. We then apply Eq. (12) into Eqs. (5)-(6) to calculate 
𝑃𝑛𝑗(𝛿𝑗) in the objective function.  
Equation (11) bounds ticket prices on customer willingness to pay 𝜛𝑛 , which is now stochastic 
constraints because of the presence of a stochastic term 𝜛𝑛. By introducing Eq. (9) in (11), Eq. (11) 
becomes Eq. (13). 
𝑓𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗 − 𝑤 ≤ 𝜀, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑂 (13) 
Considering the concept of 𝛼-reliability (e.g., if 𝛼 = 0.05, there is a 95% chance that the optimal ticket 
price will not exceed the customer’s willingness to pay), then Eq. (13) can be expressed deterministically 
as a chance constraint (14). 
𝛷[𝑓𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗 − 𝑤] ≤ 1 − 𝛼, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑂 , (14) 
where 𝛷(𝑧) = Pr (𝑍 ≤ 𝑧) is the cumulative density function of Z.  
According to Shapiro et al. (2009), the nonlinear constraint Eq. (14) can be transformed into a linear 
inequality as Eq. (15): 
𝑓𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗 − 𝑤 ≤ 𝑍1−𝛼𝑠. (15) 
Eq. (15) means that the higher variation of customer’s willingness to pay is, the higher ticket price could 
be set up to maximize the operator’s profit. In reality, an operator needs to further calibrate the 
variation of user’s willingness to pay to better capture customer’s sensitivity to ticket price.  
The transformed linear constrained optimization problem can be solved without difficulty using the 
classical Lagrange multiplier methods (Bertsekas, 2016). We use the commercial Matlab solver fmincon 
to obtain the solution efficiently. 
 
5. Numerical experiments 
In this section, we apply the model on numerical examples to quantify the effect of chance constrained 
dynamic pricing on the operator’s profit and user’s inconvenience. Our goal is to demonstrate the 
methodology via numerical simulations. The applications on real-world services would be future 
extensions of this work by considering time-window constraints, synchronization at transit stations to 
minimize customer’s transfer inconvenience, and other realistic considerations. The numerical 
experiment is divided into two parts. First, we discuss the generation of the test instance and the utility 
function specification. Then we analyze the computational results for different arrival intensities. 
Finally, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to evaluate the impact of different decision parameters. 
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5.1. Data generation and utility function specification 
 
We consider a 20 km × 20 km region with a transit network. Demand is assumed to be randomly 
distributed following a Poisson distribution with the arrival intensity of 𝜆 (customers/hour).  The spatial 
distribution of customer pick-up and drop-off points are shown in Fig. 4. The entire region is divided 
into a 16 zones with an identical size of 5 km × 5 km. A number of vehicles are initially deployed at the 
centroid of each zone by a microtransit operator. We assume vehicles need to return to the depots after 
service. For the transit network, six transit lines (i.e., North–South, East–West, Northeast–Southwest, 
Northwest–Southeast, two ring-lines) operate in both directions with pre-defined timetables. The 
capacity and frequency of transit lines are assumed to be sufficient to absorb demand without congestion 
at the transit stations. 
 
As we have no empirical stated/revealed survey data to calibrate demand function of users, we will 
follow the state of the art random utility theory based on hypothetical utility function specification 
(Train, 2009). A set of mode choice alternatives are assumed to be available for each customer including: 
walk, bike, car, taxi, transit, rideshare, rideshare+transit for their mode choice decision. We assume that 
these alternatives have an implicit nested structure as shown in Fig. 3. The deterministic part of the 
customer utility function is specified as a function of alternative-specific attributes as Eq. (16), 
considering main mode choice influence factors (Wen et al., 2018; Hörl, et al,2019): 
 
𝑉𝑛𝑗 = 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗𝑋𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽𝐼𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐼𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑛𝑗, 
 
(16) 
where 
𝐼𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑗 is the in-vehicle travel time of mode j for customer n; 
𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑗 is the out-of-vehicle travel time of mode j for customer n; 
𝐶𝑛𝑗 is the travel cost of mode j for customer n; 
𝑋𝑛𝑗 is a mode-specific dummy variable for mode j for customer n; 
𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗 is alternative-specific constant for mode j. 
 
The parameters of the NL models are assumed to be unknown for the operator. Via the collection of the 
customer choice data over time, the operator can calibrate the parameters of the choice model over time 
(e.g., at the end of each day). The unknown true coefficients are assumed to be  𝛽𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑇 = −0.032, 
𝛽𝐼𝑉𝑇𝑇 = −0.023 and 𝛽𝑐 = −0.074, adapted from the case study of Liu et al. (2018). For simplicity, we 
assume the alternative-specific constant (ASC) value to be 0 for all alternatives. The unknown true 
scaling parameters are assumed to be (𝜇𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 , 𝜇𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜, 𝜇𝑝𝑡) = (1, 2, 2) . Note that one can 
calibrate the ASCs based on the observed market share of realistic applications (Train, 2009).  
 
The experiment setting related to the characteristics of different transport modes is as follows.  
 
 Walk: The average speed is assumed to be 5 km/ hour. 
 Bike: The average speed is assumed to be16 km/hour. 
 Car: The average speed is assumed to be 25 km/hour. The average cost of driving by car is assumed 
to be 0.33 $/km (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2009). No parking cost is considered. 
 Taxi: An average 5 minute waiting time is assumed. The taxi fare is $3.0 (initial cost) + $1.56 per 
kilometer traveled.1   
 Transit: Travel time includes access times, in-vehicle travel time, and waiting times at stations. The 
access mode from and to the nearest stations is assumed to be on foot. Transit speed is assumed to 
be 60 km/hour. An average waiting time of 5 minutes is assumed, given the headway of 10 minutes. 
The transit fare 𝑓𝑝𝑡 is $2.75 per ride. 
 Rideshare: The fare is composed of two parts: a base fare and an extra distance-based fare (Häll, 
2006) defined as 
                                                     
1 https://www.taxi-calculator.com/taxi-fare-new-york-city/259 
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𝑓𝑟 = 𝑓0 + θ𝑑𝑟 , (17) 
where 𝑓0 is the base fare, assumed to be $1, 𝜃 is the per-unit-distance (in kilometers) fare, assumed 
to be $ (𝑐̅ + 0.1)/km, where 𝑐̅ is the average operating cost per kilometer traveled, taking into 
account driver and fuel cost. 𝑑𝑟 is the travel distance between the origin and destination of customer 
r. In the numerical study, distance is measured as the Euclidean distance.  
 Rideshare+Transit: The fare is the total fare to use rideshare and transit, i.e., 𝑓r+𝑝𝑡 = 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑓𝑝𝑡, where 
𝑓𝑟 is the fare for the rideshare leg and 𝑓𝑝𝑡 is the cost of the transit leg.  
 
We consider the morning peak-hour commuting simulation scenario from 7:00 to 9:00. Customers are 
randomly generated in terms of origins and destinations at the beginning of each day with a Poisson 
arrival intensity. We run over 20 days (iterations) to calibrate demand parameters. As the true parameters 
of customers’ utility function are unknown, we set initial values of these parameters as ?̂?𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑇
0 = −0.2, 
?̂?𝐼𝑉𝑇𝑇
0 = −0.1, and ?̂?𝑐
0 = −0.1; (?̂?𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑
0 , ?̂?𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜
0 , ?̂?𝑝𝑡
0 ) = (1,1,1). 
 
The simulation was implemented by Matlab on a Dell Latitude E5470 laptop with win64 OS, Intel i5-
6300U CPU, 2 Cores and 8GB memory. Table 2 reports relevant reference parameter settings. The data 
used in this study is freely available at https://github.com/tym677. 
 
 
Table 2. Reference parameter settings of the experiment 
Fleet size (vehicle) 40  
Number of zones 16 
Capacity of vehicle (customers/vehicle) 10  
Idle vehicle relocation interval (minute) 15 
k-nearest entry (exit) stations considered* 4 
𝛼 (Eq.(14)) 0.05 
Remark: A total of 𝑘2 = 16 paths are searched when determining the entry and exit stations for a 
rideshare+transit option generation. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Pick-up and drop-off locations of ride requests (𝜆=400 customers/hour) 
 
5.2. Results 
  
We estimate the model parameters at the end of each day using historical choice data. The maximum-
likelihood approach is applied for parameter calibration. Fig. 5 reports the convergence result of the 
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calibrated parameters of the NL model. The gap function is defined as the summation of the absolute 
values of the difference between the estimated and true parameters. As shown in Fig. 5, the gap falls 
quickly from 2.25 to 0.5 after 2 and 3 iterations (days) given different arrival intensities. The gap 
function stabilizes with small fluctuations from the 6th iteration, with a gap of around 0.25. The gap 
reflects a day-to-day stochastic user equilibrium fluctuation in a stochastic environment (Djavadian and 
Chow, 2017). 
    
 
Fig. 5. Convergence of the gap function for the estimated NL model parameters. 
 
Table 3 reports the impact of different pricing schemes on the mode shares over ‘rideshare’ and 
‘rideshare+transit’. The result shows that when customer arrival intensity is increased (i.e. 𝜆=200 
customers/hour or above), applying the dynamic pricing scheme could shift the ridership from “rideshare 
only” to “rideshare+transit”. Due to this effect, the mean vehicle travel times (see Table 4) are reduced 
due to more customers being dropped off at nearby transit stations. Moreover, more vehicles would be 
made available due to more “rideshare+transit” users, resulting in lower waiting times to get picked up. 
Table 4 compares the system performances in terms of customer inconvenience and operating costs 
under different demand intensities. It shows that for 𝜆=100 customers/hour, the mean waiting time and 
mean passenger journey time remain almost unchanged. However, the mean vehicle travel time is 
reduced around –5.24% due to lower ridership after applying the dynamic price scheme (i.e., –1.2% for 
“rideshare only” and –9.1% for “rideshare+transit”, shown in Table 5).  
 
 
Table 3. Mode share for systems with and without price optimization (%) 
 𝜆=100 𝜆=200 
 Rideshare Rideshare+Transit Rideshare 
Rideshare 
+Transit 
No price optimization 22.7 18.5 21.5 17.0 
With price optimization 22.4(-1.2%) 16.8(-9.1%) 20.4(-5.1%) 17.8 (+4.7%) 
No WTP constraints 13.2(-41.9) 9.9(-46.5%) 10.1(-53.0%) 8.1(-52.4%) 
  𝜆=400 𝜆=800 
 Rideshare Rideshare+Transit Rideshare 
Rideshare 
+Transit 
No price optimization 18.3 14.1 11.9 11.1 
With price optimization 17.2(-5.7%) 15.2(+7.9%) 11.4(-4.2%) 11.9(+7.2%) 
No WTP constraints 10.9(-40.4%) 8.8(-37.6%) 8.4(-29.4%) 6.4(-42.3%) 
  Remark: 1.The reported values are the average mode shares over 20 iterations for a 2 hour customer arrival   
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                 period. 2. WTP means willingness to pay, measured in USD. 
 
 
 
Table 4. System performance for systems with and without price optimization 
  𝜆=100   𝜆=200  
 WT JT VTL WT JT VTL 
No price optimization 6.4 26.0 76.3 8.2 29.6 123.5 
With price optimization 6.4 25.9  72.3 7.9 28.3 121.0 
±% (0%) (-0.38%) (-5.24%) (-3.36%) (-4.66%) (-2.04%) 
  𝜆=400   𝜆=800  
 WT JT VTL WT JT VTL 
No price optimization 13.9 41.2 172.1 27.3 59.6 217.7 
With price optimization 12.9 38.6 168.9 26.2 56.9 213.2 
±% (-7.19%) (-6.31%) (-1.86%) (-4.03%) (-4.53%) (-2.07%) 
Remark: 1. WT: mean passenger waiting time, JT: mean passenger journey time, VTL:  mean vehicle travel 
time, defined as total vehicle travel times divided by the number of vehicles. 2. Measured in minutes. 
 
 
In terms of the operator profit, Table 5 reports the impact of applying the proposed dynamic pricing 
method. When applying the pricing scheme, the average profit of the operator increases from +20.8% 
to +23.9% under different demand levels. The standard deviation of the profit is around 2.4 times higher 
compared to that for the system without price optimization. Fig. 6 displays the variation in the operator’s 
profit over time. This shows that over time, the system with price optimization has significantly higher 
profit compared to the system without (except on day 10 for the low-demand case). 
 
 
Table 5. Operator profit per iteration (day) for systems with and without price optimization 
 𝜆=100 𝜆=200 
 Without price opt. With price opt. Without price opt. With price opt. 
Mean  149.7 184.6 (+23.3%) 280.3 347.2(+23.9%) 
S.D. 10.7 23.9 12.3 27.6 
Avg. computational 
time per iteration 
(second) 100 114 181 188 
  𝜆=400 𝜆=800 
 Without price opt. With price opt. Without price opt. With price opt. 
Mean  470.2 581.1 (+23.6%) 656.3 793.1(+20.8%) 
S.D. 14.1 35.0 21.8 39.3 
Avg. computational 
time per iteration 
(second)  348 354 951 1006 
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Fig. 6. Operator profit for systems with and without price optimization under different customer 
arrival intensities 
 
 
Fig. 7 shows the impact of the proposed chance-constrained assortment pricing model on ticket prices 
for “rideshare only” and “rideshare+transit”. The left panel in Fig. 7 shows that applying pricing 
optimization increases the fares of “rideshare only”. However, the distribution of ticket prices for 
“rideshare+transit” is over a wider range and with lower prices in general compared with the initial fare 
without price optimization (right panel of Fig. 7). The range of ticket prices after the constrained price 
optimization is under 8 dollars. Note that for short-distance trips, the proposed ticket prices are relatively 
low due to lower customer willingness to pay for that travel distance. Furthermore, neglecting customer 
willingness to pay constraints would lead to unrealistically high ticket prices (around 23 dollars/ride for 
“rideshare only”) and reduce ridership significantly under different demand levels (e.g., –40.4% 
(rideshare only) and –36.5% (rideshare+transit) for 𝜆 = 400 customers/hour; see Table 3). Clearly, this 
shows the importance of making use of customer willingness to pay as a constraint to frame the ticket 
price within acceptable values for customers, in order to keep the proposed MOD services competitive 
in a multimodal transport market.  
 
Fig. 7. Cumulative probability functions of ticket prices for systems with and without price optimization 
(𝜆 = 400 customers/hour, WTP means willingness-to-pay)  
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Fig. 8 depicts the mode shares for different transport modes in the high demand case ( 𝜆 =400 
customers/hour). We find that the proposed pricing model would shift “rideshare only” users to 
“rideshare+transit” while keeping the mode shares of the other modes (almost) unchanged. However, 
the classical unconstrained assortment pricing optimization would result in a significant mode shift from 
the rideshare options to the other modes (i.e., car, taxi, and bike) due to its unrealistically high ticket 
prices.  
 
Clearly, the proposed pricing approach could significantly increase the operator’s profit while reducing 
user inconvenience and operating costs by setting up a more attractive price for “rideshare+transit” 
compared to “rideshare only”.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Mode share for systems with and without price optimization (𝜆=400) 
 
 
5.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section, we investigate how different system parameters, i.e., vehicle capacity and the variance 
of customer willingness to pay, impact the performance of the proposed model. We analyze the impacts 
for two different customer arrival intensities corresponding to low (𝜆 = 100 customers/hour) and high 
(𝜆 = 400 customers/hour) demand levels under the same simulation settings as described in Section 
5.1. 
 
5.3.1. Influence of vehicle capacity  
We vary the capacity of vehicles over three scenarios: 5, 10, and 15 passengers/vehicle. Table 6 
compares the average profit and performance of systems with and without price optimization. Overall, 
the results confirm the benefit of the proposed pricing model on operator profit (i.e., +23.3% to + 24.9%) 
given different capacities of vehicles.  
  
Table 6. The influence of vehicle capacity on operator profit and system performance with and without 
price optimization 
 𝑞𝑣 = 5 𝑞𝑣 = 10 𝑞𝑣 = 15 
 P.O. 
Profit WT JT VTL Profit WT JT VTL Profit WT JT VTL 
𝜆=100 
Without 149.7 6.4 26.0 76.3 149.7 6.4 26.0 76.3 149.7 6.4 26.0 76.3 
With 184.6 6.4 25.9 72.3 184.6 6.4 25.9 72.3 184.6 6.4 25.9 72.3 
 ±% +23.3 -1.5 -0.5 -5.3 +23.3 -1.5 -0.5 -5.3 +23.3 -1.5 -0.5 -5.3 
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 Without 469.8 14.0 41.3 172.4 470.2 13.9 41.2 172.1 468.1 13.8 40.8 170.7 
𝜆 =400 With 583.0 13.3 39.2 169.3 581.1 13.0 38.8 168.6 583.0 13.3 39.2 169.3 
 ±% +24.1 -4.4 -4.9 -1.8 +24.9 -6.9 -5.9 -2.1 +24.5 -3.7 -4.0 -0.8 
Remark: 1. P.O: price optimization. 2. WT: mean passenger waiting time, JT: mean passenger journey time, VTL:  
mean vehicle travel time.   
 
5.3.2. Influence of 𝜎 
Let us look at how the variance of customer willingness to pay influences the performance of the 
proposed pricing model. We vary 𝜎 over three values: 0, 1, and 4. Table 7 shows that increasing 𝜎 
results in a significantly higher average profit for the operator. For ticket prices, we find that the higher 
the variance of customer willingness to pay, the higher the average ticket prices proposed by the dynamic 
pricing scheme. The price increases from around $3.5 to $6.8 if 𝜎 increases from $0 to $4. However, 
for mode shares of the MOD service, the price decreases accordingly from –6.5% to –7.7% for 𝜆=100 
and 𝜆=400 (customers/hour), respectively. Fig. 9 shows the day-to-day variation in operator profit based 
on different values of 𝜎. Again, 𝜎 needs to be calibrated in realistic applications to capture the variation 
of customer’s willingness to pay to achieve the desired objective.  
 
 
Table 7. The influence of 𝜎 on the operator’s average profit per iteration (day) with pricing  
                        optimization 
  𝜆=100   𝜆=400  
 𝜎 =0 𝜎 =1 𝜎 =4 𝜎 =0 𝜎 =1 𝜎 =4 
Mean  184.6 304.0 408.5 581.1 975.0 1329.7 
S.D. 20.2 30.4 34.3 31.5 39.4 56.0 
 
 
Table 8. The influence of 𝜎 on the profit, ticket prices, and mode share of the MOD services per 
iteration 
  𝜆=100 𝜆=400 
  Mean S.D Mean S.D 
𝜎 =0 Profit 184.6 20.2 581.1 31.5 
 Price 3.52 1.74 3.55 1.54 
 Mode share (%) 39.2 2.8 32.4 1.3 
𝜎 =1 Profit 304 30.4 975 39.4 
 Price 5.17 1.75 5.21 1.51 
 Mode share (%) 38.8 3.0 31.3 1.5 
𝜎 =4 Profit 408.5 34.3 1329.7 56 
 Price 6.86 1.79 6.84 1.56 
 Mode share (%) 36.7 2.9 29.9 1.1 
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Fig. 9. Comparison of operator profit under different 𝜎 (𝜆 = 400) 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we propose a dynamic integrated microtransit system with customer demand learning and  
dynamic pricing based on user’s willingness-to-pay constraints. We consider two kinds of MOD 
services in a multimodal transport market: classical door-to-door rideshare and an integrated rideshare 
with transit transfer service. In the proposed dynamic pricing model, customer choice behavior is 
integrated for constrained assortment pricing optimization to maximize the expected profit of operators. 
Under the assumption of the ability to collect customer choice intentions from the operator’s service 
platform/application, we demonstrate that the choice model can be calibrated over time. However, when 
only purchased MOD service mode choices are observable, one can apply the methodology of Talluri 
and Van Ryzin (2006, Chapter 9) to calibrate the choice model based on the incomplete data.   
We demonstrate the proposed methodology through a numerical example to quantify the effect of 
dynamic pricing. While we did not model the endogenous network congestion effect due to day-to-day 
traffic flow changes on the multimodal network, this paper did consider the interactions of supply and 
demand in a multimodal market by integrating customer mode choice behavior into a constrained pricing 
scheme. We tested the proposed model under different scenarios in terms of customer arrival intensity, 
vehicle capacity, and the variance of user willingness to pay. Results suggest that the proposed chance-
constrained assortment price optimization model allows increasing operator profit while keeping the 
proposed ticket prices acceptable. However, a classical non-constrained assortment price optimization 
approach would result in unrealistically high ticket prices and a significant reduction in the ridership of 
MOD services. Results show that the impact of the proposed pricing model could be to reduce system 
operating costs and customer inconvenience due to a more attractive ticket price setting for the 
“rideshare+transit” option after price optimization.  
In terms of policy implication, recent studies shows the importance of pricing context and customer’s 
behavior in response to the trade-off of ticket price and level of service for MOD service planning (Chow 
et al., 2020). Future research could improve this work by considering an agent-based stochastic user 
equilibrium and more realistic modeling of transportation system dynamics. From the government 
perspective, it is interesting to maximize social welfare based on the dynamic ticket prices setting. Other 
online survey methodologies (e.g., smartphone survey) can be designed to collect customers’ 
willingness to pay for different user groups. For mode choice behavior modeling, it is also desirable to 
incorporate an individual’s socio-demographic variables to explain the heterogeneity of travel 
preference, among many other practical aspects, to improve the realistic application of the proposed 
modeling approach.     
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